Can a global climate risk pool help the most vulnerable countries?















The optimal response to climate change is a mix of deep greenhouse-gas
emissions cuts, investment to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change
and endurance of some climate-related events against which protection
would be too expensive. Extreme climate events related to global warming
will happen somewhat randomly and could have a huge cost for the most
vulnerable countries. A global cli-
mate risk pool, with contributions
from all countries, could help these
vulnerable countries to recover
from such events and might thus
smooth the way towards a broader
climate deal. As extreme events,
such as storm surges, will increase
because of climate change, the
pool can only insure events that
significantly exceed the trend line.




















































































CAN A GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK POOL HELP THE MOST VULNERABLE COUNTRIES?
THE IDEA OF A CLIMATE RISK
POOL
Global  warming  increases  the
chance of extreme weather risks,
which  should  be  insured  against
as an element in global solidarity
and  to  ensure  that  vulnerable
countries’  fiscal  capacities  and
incoming  investment  can  be
maintained  as  far  as  possible.
pooling  risk  can  thus  avoid
vicious  cycles  initiated  by  rare
local events. Climate-related risks
include the occurrence of very dif-
ferent  natural  disasters,  such  as
floods,  droughts,  hurricanes  or






improving  the  access  of  the
poorest  to  private  insurance,  for
example  through  capacity  build-
ing  in  the  underdeveloped
financial  sectors  of  developing
countries.
But  local  and  regional  climate
events will not only affect compa-
nies  and  individuals  that  might





hence  fiscal  capacity  of  a  devel-
oping  country,  because  they will
result  in  lower  tax  revenues  and
high rebuilding costs. Developing
countries  cannot  insure  against





a  financial  buffer  for  such  situa-
tions. international risk pooling is
the only sensible strategy. other-
wise  investors  might  shy  away
from all potentially affected coun-
tries,  because of unpredictability
in  how  they  will  respond  to
climate-related crises – for exam-





climate  risk  pool  is  to  protect
vulnerable countries against such
‘fiscal  shocks’  following  extreme
weather  events.  This  global  pool
can  build  on  experiences  with
regional  insurance  pools  for
natural  disasters  such  as  the
african  Risk  Capacity  and  the
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk insur-
ance Facility.
Identifying extreme events in
times of climate change
Climate  related  disaster-insur-
ance  is  an  instrument  for  risk
reduction  that  can  protect  devel-
oping  and  least  developed
economies:  it  operates  through
the  provision  of  security  against




loss  risk  among  people  and
across time. however, in the case
of  climate-related  disasters,
insurance  cannot  be  reliably
based  on  historic  data  because
the  frequency  and  magnitude  of
some  types  of  events  are
expected  to  increase  in  some
regions. Climate change is a struc-
tural  shift  and  its  main  effects
(sea  level  rise, changing regional
climate)  will  not  happen  gradu-
ally, but through repeated shocks.
So  any  insurance  approach  will
have  to  reliably  tell  apart,  which
effects  are  ‘extreme  events’  that
can be insured against and which
effects  are  ‘below  the  trend’–
eg  what  is  a  flood  and what  is  a
sea-level rise.
an upward trend in storm surges,
as  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  might




sidered  ‘normal’  if  they  are  not





























































Trend Co untry A Co untry B Co untry A w/o clima te change
Figure 1: Maximum annual storm-surge, stylised example
Source: Bruegel.










03modelling  preferred  by  the  inter-governmental  panel  on  Climate




addition,  this  new  trend  is  not
expected  to  develop  uniformly
across  the  globe,  but  to  develop
very  differently  for  different
regions  (Dasgupta  et al,  2014).
hence, there still appears to be a
significant  knowledge  gap  about
the  regional  impacts  of  climate
change.
Figure  1  shows  a  stylised  exam-
ple  of  a  maximum  annual  storm
surge.  a  storm surge  is  a  coastal
flood of  rising water caused by a
tropical  cyclone  in  combination
with  the  timing  of  tides.  The
upward  sloping  line  (blue)
reflects  the expected  increase  in
the  maximum  height  of  annual
storm  surges  as  a  consequence
of  climate  change.  other  lines
show the maximum annual storm
surge experienced by countries a
and  B.  The  trend  in  maximum
annual storm surge in both coun-
tries  is  upward,  because  the
maximum  storm  surge  level  is











years  flood  happens  about  once
in  a  thousand  years.  Conse-
quently,  all  extreme  events  for
which  we  expect  an  increase  in
frequency  or  amplitude  because
of  climate  change would  have  to
fall under the insurance scheme.
Consequently, the conditions that
trigger  a  pay-out  would  need  to
change over time and need to be








on  the  latest  available  informa-
tion,  are  conceivable1.  But  there
remains  a  significant  amount  of
discretion in selecting the model,
which  is  a  political  problem,
because  the  selection  of  the
model  will  have  distributional
consequences.  in  addition,
extreme  weather  insurance  is
often not linked to a single meas-
ure,  but  to  a  weather  index
compiling  different  meteorologi-
cal  measures  (which  might  for
example include, rainfall, temper-
ature,  humidity,  fog  or  wind
velocity). So again, there is some
room for discretion.
The  second  issue  is  the  pay-out,
in  case  the  trigger-point  is
reached.  Making  the  pay-out
dependent  on  the  actual  cost  of
the event might provide an incen-
tive to under-invest in adaptation.
So  a  direct  pay-out  function
based  on  how  much  the  trigger-
point  has  been  exceeded  would
make most  sense.  This  is  in  line
with  our  proposal  to  cover  the
fiscal/macroeconomic  conse-
quences  of  the  extreme  event
instead  of  the  actual  cost.  But
again,  a  sensible  calibration




Coping  with  climate  change
requires  finding  the  optimal
balance  between  adaptation  to
the  impacts  of  climate  change,
enduring some of the effects and
insuring  against  certain  extreme
risk.
in  the  case  of  extreme  weather
events,  hochrainer-Stigler  et al
(2014)  assess  countries’  vulner-
ability to ‘fiscal disasters’, defined
as  the  public  sector’s  ability  to
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CAN A GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK POOL HELP THE MOST VULNERABLE COUNTRIES?
population and support the recon-
struction  of  lost  assets  and
infrastructure.  using  methods  to
estimate extremes of country dis-
aster  risk,  they  find  that  many
countries appear fiscally vulnera-
ble and would require assistance
from  donors  in  order  to  bolster
their  fiscal  resilience.  an  initial
estimate is in the order of $3.3 bil-
lion annually to cover those gaps
in  fiscal  resources  in  case  of
extreme  weather  events,  which
can  happen  once  in  every  10  to
50 years.
This  amount  should  be  seen  in
the  context  of  the  annual
adaptation  needs  of  developing










this  in  the  framework  of  the
united  nations  Framework  Con-
vention  on  Climate  Change
(unFCCC)  –  which  has  held
annual Conferences of the parties
(Cops)  since  1992.  The  unFCCC
process  requires  unanimity.  This
is  a  significant  challenge,
because  the  costs  of  mitigation,
adaptation  and  endurance  in  dif-
ferent  countries  vary  markedly.
To  ensure  the  participation  of
developing  and  transition  coun-
tries,  so  far  only  industrialised
countries  have  been  required  to
undertake mitigation efforts.  This
has to change, because the devel-
oped-country  share  of  global
emissions fell from more than half






phere  (which  have  already
contributed to a warming of about
1°C  above  pre-industrial  levels)
served the rich countries to reach
their  current  levels  of  develop-
ment.  international  efforts  on
climate change are thus based on
the  principles  that  industrialised
countries should (1) reduce their
greenhouse  gas  emissions  to  a
level that allows developing coun-
tries  to  maintain  a  modest




(3)  provide  some  financing  for
adaptation and mitigation (prefer-
ably  in  the  form  of  grants);  and
(4)  provide  compensation  for
losses  arising  from  climate
change.
Whether this is fair or not is irrele-
vant.  Each  of  the  four  items  is  a
major  issue  in  the  unFCCC
process2.  So  concessions  by  the
developed  countries  on  those
items might  be  crucial  to  secure
participation  from  developing
countries.  and  in  fact,  the  G7
countries  have  acknowledged
their readiness to provide climate
finance,  and  to  help  to  organise
private  climate  insurance  and
technology transfer to developing
countries (Group of Seven, 2015).
Many  of  these  commitments  are
still  rather  vague,  as  explicit
transfers  of  fiscal  resources  are
an extremely thorny issue. But as
Wolff  and  Zachmann  (2015)




is  much  cheaper  than  shoulder-
ing  more  extreme  mitigation
burdens  (if  the  Eu  decides  to  go
from 40  percent  decarbonisation
to  60  percent  decarbonisation,  it
will  reduce  global  emissions  by
only  2  percent).  accordingly,  we
argue that providing a mechanism
for  pooling  the  risks  of  extreme
climate-related  events  –  which
should (as we will explain below)
also  entail  a  transfer  component
– could also offer business oppor-
tunities  for  developed  countries
(eg  for  financial  and  insurance
services)  and  would  be  cheaper
than  a  corresponding  additional
increase  in  developed  countries’
mitigation ambitions.
HOW TO DESIGN A CLIMATE RISK
POOL?
The  principles  of  (re-)insurance
can be applied  in  the design of a
global climate risk pool. The insur-
ance  literature  stresses  the






work  on  climate  adaptation  (for
example, no more buildings along
vulnerable  coastlines,  better
infrastructure  to  weather  hurri-
canes). next, the premium should
be  partly  related  to  a  country’s
carbon  footprint  to  provide  an
incentive  for  climate  mitigation.
This is basically the ‘polluter pays’
principle.
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These  elements  produce  the  fol-
lowing premium structure:
premiums  for  vulnerable•
countries  based  on  risk  of
climate  hazard  and  green-
house-gas footprint;
premiums  for  donor  coun-•
tries  based  on  GDp  and
greenhouse-gas footprint.
The  Global  Facility  for  Disaster
Reduction  and  Recovery,  estab-
lished  by  the  World  Bank,  pro-
vides  already  expertise  for  the
african  Risk  Capacity  and  the
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk insur-
ance  Facility  (CCRiF,  see  Box  2).
Building on this infrastructure, the
World  Bank  in  conjunction  with
the  Global  Facility  for  Disaster
Reduction  and  Recovery  could
provide  the  global  climate  risk
pool’s  secretariat,  including  the
necessary  climate  expertise  to
devise  objective  hydro-meteoro-
logical  standards  (Courbage  and
pay-out.  our  scheme  would  help
protect  countries  against  fiscal
disasters  by  paying  out  in  the
event of climate-related disasters
that  exceed  the  trend  line  by  a
certain  amount.  as  climate
change is underway, the trigger or
meteorological  threshold  for
‘extreme’  events  will  also  be
subject  to  change  over  time.  The
high  uncertainty  about  future
extreme  events  would  make  a




that  they  tend  to  charge  much
higher  premiums  if  risks  are  not
well  specified  (kunreuther  et al,
1995).  This  reinforces  the  point
that it would be difficult for vulner-
able  countries  to  bear  the  full
costs  of  climate  insurance  (see
also  the  communiqué  of  the
vulnerable Twenty Group, 2015).
The  insured  amount  will  be
related to the extremeness of the
event and will be anyway capped.
The  ‘extremeness’  will  be  based
on meteorological standards (see
below)  and  not  on  actual  dam-
ages. That fits in with the idea that
the  global  climate  risk  pool  aims
to  help  countries  deal  with  the
fiscal and macroeconomic conse-
quences  of  an  extreme  natural
disaster.
any burden sharing arrangement
for  public  goods  has  to  strike  a
balance  between  the  capacity  to
pay  and  the  contribution  to  the
problem.  in  the  case  of  burden
sharing for a nuclear accident, for
example, a participating country’s
burden  is  based  on  its  wealth
measured  in GDp and  its nuclear
industry  measured  in  thermal
power (see Box 1).





of  damage  caused  by  nuclear  accidents  is  not  confined  to  national




party  liability  in  the  Field  of  nuclear  Energy  and  its  Brussels  Supple-
mentary Convention are legally binding arrangements. The conventions
provide  for a  tribunal  (European nuclear Energy Tribunal)  to settle dis-









3. liability  for  costs  from  €1.2  billion  up  to  €1.5  billion  is  shared
between all participating countries (Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion).
The third  tier  is  international burden sharing. The Brussels Supplemen-
tary Convention is basically a western European treaty administered by
the organisation  for Economic Cooperation and Development.  The con-
tracting  parties  are 16 European  countries:  the  former  Eu15  countries
(except for austria, ireland, and luxemburg), norway, Slovenia, Switzer-
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BOX 2: NATURAL DISASTER INSURANCE POOLS





The (aRC)  is a specialised agency of  the african union with a mission  is  to use  innovative  financial mecha-

















Members  of  CCRiF:  anguilla,  antigua  and  Barbuda,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Bermuda,  Cayman  islands,
Dominica, Grenada, haiti, Jamaica, St. kitts and nevis, Saint lucia, St. vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and
Tobago and Turks and Caicos islands.
Table 1: CCRIF pay-outs, 2007-15 period
Event Date Country Affected Payouts (US$)
Earthquake 29-nov-07 Dominica 528,021$
Earthquake 29-nov-07 Saint lucia 418,976$
Tropical Cyclone ike Sep-08 Turks and Caicos islands 6,303,913$
Earthquake,  12-Jan-10 haiti 7,753,579$
Tropical Cyclone Earl aug-10 anguilla 4,282,733$
Tropical Cyclone Tomas  oct-10 Barbados 8,560,247$
Tropical Cyclone Tomas oct-10 Saint lucia 3,241,613$





Trough System 7-8 nov 2014 anguilla 559,249$
Trough System 7-8 nov 2014 St. kitts & nevis 1,055,408$
Trough System 21-nov-14 Barbados 1,284,882$




Mahul,  2013).  The  pool  can  be
based on a public-private partner-
ship.
For  the  public  part,  an  official
treaty  and  tribunal  (to  settle  dis-
putes) would be needed to make
the obligations of donor countries
enforceable.  in  the  design  of  the
treaty, one must resolve a poten-
tial  time-inconsistency  of  the
pledges by rich countries today to
pay for future climate events, and
deal with  the  incentive  to  renege
when  such  events  start  to
become  really  expensive.  a  typi-
cal  (re)insurance  contract  has  a
period of cover of one year, which
is  very  short.  nevertheless,  the





started  in  the  1960s,  allows
notice  periods  to  be  activated
only  after  an  initial  ten-year
lock-in period.
To get started, we propose that the
G7,  which  has  already  made
pledges on climate insurance, and
the  vulnerability  Twenty  Group,
representing the most           vulner-
able countries, take the initiative to
establish  the  global  climate  risk
pool. other countries can join later.
Based  on  the  proposed  premium
structure  and  the  initial  ten-year
lock  in  period,  the  G7  and  v20
(joined by others) can start to build
a reinsurance fund for ‘fiscal disas-
ters’  following  extreme  weather
events  by  paying  premiums  into
the risk pool. after ten years, some
funds  for  the  insurance  pool may
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CONCLUSION 
While coping with climate change
requires  a  clear  focus  on mitiga-
tion  and  adaptation,  a  global
climate  risk  pool  might  make  it
easier for developed and develop-
ing  countries  to  agree  on
measures  to  tackle  global  warm-
ing.  The  most  vulnerable
countries cannot deal with future
extreme  events  on  their  own.  a
global climate risk pool, with a mix
of contributions from donor coun-
tries  and  insured  countries,  can
prevent  a  vicious  fiscal  cycle  in
these  countries.  insurance
against  a  one-in-fifty-year  event
might  enable  vulnerable  coun-
tries  to  recover  from  such  a
macroeconomic and fiscal shock.
post-paris,  the  Group  of  Seven
and  the  vulnerability  Twenty
Group  could  take  the  lead  in
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